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Comments	on:	“Jump‐starting	the	euro	area	recovery:	would	a	rise	in	core	fiscal	
spending	help	the	periphery”	NBER	Macroeconomics	Annual	2016.	
	
Ricardo	Reis	
London	School	of	Economics	
	
16th	of	June,	2016	
	
	
I.	Introduction	
	
	 This	paper	by	Blanchard,	Erceg	and	Linde,	provides	a	two‐country	model	to	
understand	the	spillovers	from	one	country’s	fiscal	expansion	on	another	country’s	
macroeconomy.	The	authors	do	not	want	to	merely	provide	a	theoretical	discussion	
of	what	 determines	 these	 spillovers	 in	 abstract,	 but	 they	 also	want	 to	 apply	 their	
framework	to	the	Euro	Area.	After	showing	that	spillovers	from	a	fiscal	expansion	in	
the	core	 to	the	periphery	will	be	 larger	 if	 there	 is	a	 longer‐lasting	 liquidity	 trap,	 if	
the	Phillips	 curve	 is	 steeper,	 and	 if	 the	 import	 content	of	 government	 spending	 is	
larger,	they	further	conclude	that	the	boost	to	output	in	the	periphery	is	larger	than	
the	effect	on	consumption	and	welfare.	Their	preferred	numerical	estimates	point	to	
an	aggregate	euro	area	multiplier	of	around	2	and	a	boost	to	welfare	in	both	the	core	
and	the	periphery.	
	
Before	 thinking	about	what	 to	make	of	 their	points,	 it	 helps	 to	 fix	 ideas	by	
asking	 to	which	 two	actual	 euro	area	 regions	 their	model	might	 apply.	The	 “core”	
country	 in	 their	model	 has	 no	 fiscal	 constraint	 that	 prevents	 it	 from	 exogenously	
choosing	to	increase	public	spending.	It	can	finance	this	expansion	by	issuing	public	
debt,	 and	 this	 comes	with	no	 increase	 in	 the	 interest	 rate	 it	 pays	on	 its	 sovereign	
debt.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 large	 enough	 that	 this	 extra	 spending	will	make	a	 significant	
material	 difference	 in	 the	 exports	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Euro	 area.	 In	 turn,	 the	
“periphery”	 country	 is	 smaller,	 but	 not	 infinitesimal	 as	 in	 small	 open	 economy	
models,	since	its	actions	have	an	effect	on	the	exchange	rate	and	on	the	net	exports	
of	the	larger	core	economy.	It	has	a	similar	structure	as	the	core	country,	with	the	
same	 frictions	 leading	 to	 inefficient	 production,	 namely	monopolistic	 competition	
and	price	rigidities.	It	differs	in	the	shocks	that	hit	it	and	therefore	in	the	stage	of	the	
business	cycle.	Both	economies	have	nominal	interest	rates	stuck	at	zero.	
	
	 From	 this	 description,	 it	 seems	 adequate	 to	 equate	 the	 core	 economy	with	
Germany	 in	 Europe.	 In	 turn,	 the	 periphery	 country	 is	 probably	 best	 captured	 by	
Italy,	or	maybe	even	perhaps	France.	This	 is	not	a	model	 that	applies	easily	 to	 the	
peripheral	 countries	 of	 Greece,	 Ireland	 or	 Portugal.	 These	 countries	 are	 both	 too	
small	to	match	the	periphery	country	in	this	model,	and	too	distant	from	the	simple	
new	Keynesian	model	in	this	paper.	Capital	misallocation,	fragile	financial	systems,	
bloated	public	sectors	or	sovereign	debt	crises	are	all	important	features	of	some	of	
these	economies	that	would	interact	with	fiscal	expansions	in	a	way	that	would	have	
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large	and	relevant	effects	on	 fiscal	multipliers	(see,	e.g.,	Reis,	2013,	or	Gourinchas,	
Philippon	and	Vayanos,	forthcoming).		
	
	 Focusing	on	Germany,	at	the	time	of	this	conference,	in	2016,	the	large	wave	
of	 refugees	 into	 the	 country	 coming	 from	 the	 Middle	 East	 and	 Northern	 Africa	
dominated	the	headlines.	There	is	a	variety	of	public	spending	programs	needed	to	
process	 these	new	 immigrants	and	provide	 them	with	basic	 social	 services,	which	
across	the	EU	could	be	as	large	as	40	billion	euros	(Corsetti	et,	al,	2016).	While	this	
is	 not	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 authors	 frame	 the	 contribution	 of	 their	 paper,	 their	
analysis	and	results	can	be	used	to	answer	a	precise	question:	will	 the	 increase	 in	
public	 spending	 in	 Germany	 to	 receive	 the	 refugees	 benefit	 the	 Italian	 or	 French	
economies?	
	
The	authors	 isolate	 the	 theoretical	 channels	 that	will	affect	 the	response	 to	
this	 question	 and	 calibrate	 their	 model	 with	 European	 data	 to	 provide	 some	
estimates	of	how	large	the	effects	will	be.	 In	these	comments,	 I	start	by	discussing	
the	channels	that	the	authors	focus	on	and	then	make	three	comments.	First,	I	note	a	
few	extra	channels	that	may	be	important	for	fiscal	spillovers.	Second,	I	discuss	the	
difficulties	 with	 interpreting	 fiscal	 multipliers.	 Third,	 I	 try	 to	 complement	 the	
authors’	 analysis	 that	 focuses	 on	 traditional	 new	 Keynesian	 channels	 with	 the	
modern	 view	 of	 the	 eurocrisis,	 and	 how	 they	 may	 interact	 with	 fiscal	 spending.	
Finally,	 I	conclude	by	asking	whether	the	authors’	contribution	and	arguments	are	
coming	at	 the	 right	 time	 to	gauge	whether	 they	will	be	effective	 in	 shaping	policy	
choices	or	not.	
		
	
II.	Three	channels,	four	factors,	and	two	absences	
	
	 The	 authors	 focus	 on	 three	 channels	 that	 rely	 on	 central	 economic	
conditions,	and	as	such	are	common	to	many	modern	macroeconomic	models.	
	
	 The	first	condition	is	the	aggregate	resource	constraint	(without	investment)	
stating	 that	 output	 is	 equal	 to	 consumption	 spending,	 government	 purchases	 and	
net	exports.	From	this	condition,	applying	to	both	core	and	periphery,	one	gets	the	
first	effect	considered	by	the	authors.	An	increase	in	core	government	spending	will	
potentially	raise	output	both	in	the	core	and	in	the	periphery,	because	some	of	the	
core	government	spending	falls	on	goods	and	services	produced	in	the	periphery.	
	
	 The	second	condition	is	a	negative	relation	between	net	exports	and	the	real	
exchange	rate.	Then,	an	increase	in	core	spending	will	lead	to	an	appreciation	of	its	
real	exchange	rate,	which	will	boost	exports	from	the	periphery,	raising	its	output.	
	
	 The	third	channel	relies	on	combining	the	Euler	equation	for	consumption,	a	
no	arbitrage	 condition	between	 long	 term	real	 returns	and	one‐period	 return,	 the	
Fisher	equation	 linking	real	rates	to	domestic	 inflation,	and	a	common	union‐wide	
nominal	interest	rate	that	does	not	respond	to	changes	in	inflation.	If	inflation	in	the	
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periphery	is	higher	on	average	over	the	near	future,	then	short‐term	and	long‐term	
real	 returns	 will	 be	 lower	 in	 the	 periphery.	 This	 leads	 to	 higher	 current	
consumption,	and	so	output.	
	
	 Whatever	makes	 these	 three	 effects	 stronger	will	 boost	 the	 impact	 of	 core	
fiscal	spending	on	periphery’s	output.	The	authors	therefore	focus	on	four	factors	on	
which	 the	 fiscal	 spillover	will	depend.	First,	 the	 longer	 is	 the	expected	duration	of	
the	 liquidity	 trap	 then	 nominal	 interest	will	 stay	 fixed	 for	 longer,	 so	 the	 effect	 of	
inflation	on	long	real	interests	is	larger.	For	their	baseline	results,	countries	are	in	a		
liquidity	 trap	 for	3	years,	and	the	hike	 in	government	spending	 that	generates	 the	
higher	inflation	and	the	stimulus	through	lower	real	interest	rates	takes	place	over	
2.5	years.	Given	the	history	of	the	euro‐area	between	2011	and	2016,	these	choices	
seem	conservative.		
	
Second,	the	steeper	is	the	Phillips	curve,	then	the	more	inflation	will	increase	
as	a	result	of	the	fiscal	stimulus	and	so	the	larger	its	expansionary	effect.	Again,	the	
authors	are	conservative,	assuming	a	Calvo‐duration	of	price	stickiness	of	3.5	years,	
which	amounts	to	a	very	flat	Phillips	curve.	
	
Third,	the	larger	the	import	component	of	government	spending	in	the	core,	
then	the	larger	the	direct	aggregate	demand	effect	on	periphery	output.	The	authors	
calibrate	 this	 to	 match	 the	 average	 ratio	 of	 imports	 to	 GDP	 and	 a	 trade	 price	
elasticity	of	1.1,	which	is	line	with	the	literature.		
	
	 A	fourth	factor	is	important	in	assessing	the	fiscal	spillovers	to	welfare.	Since	
the	periphery	country	runs	a	trade	surplus	in	response	to	the	fiscal	expansion	in	the	
core,	 output	 in	 the	 periphery	 increases	 considerably	 more	 than	 its	 consumption.	
The	authors	argue	that	while	the	welfare	of	the	representative	agents	in	their	model	
would	focus	on	consumption,	if	one	thinks	instead	of	economies	with	considerable	
slack,	one	might	want	to	focus	on	output.	I	would	further	add	that	the	foundations	in	
social	welfare	theory	 for	equating	the	utility	of	a	representative	 foundation	with	a	
proper	 social	welfare	 function	 in	an	economy	with	diverse	people	are	very	 shaky.	
Therefore,	arguing	for	an	ad	hoc	welfare	function	that	focuses	on	output	instead	of	
consumption	seems	defensible.	
	
	 These	channels	and	factors	are	all	important	and	the	authors	do	well	to	focus	
on	 them	 and	 emphasize	 them.	 One	 could	 easily	 list	 many	 more	 that	 might	 be	
considered,	but	it	is	much	harder	to	argue	that	any	of	them	are	as	important	as	the	
ones	 considered	by	 the	authors.	Still,	 two	of	 them	stand	out,	 in	my	view,	as	being	
potentially	as	important,	and	so	are	worth	mentioning.	
	
	 The	 first	 is	 the	 consideration	 of	 a	 third	 region	 with	 which	 there	 is	 trade.	
Between	2010	and	2015,	the	current	account	of	the	Eurozone	went	from	a	surplus	
of	36	to	330	billion	euros,	while	Germany’s	current	account	went	from	145	to	257	
billion	euros.	The	Eurozone	adjusted	to	the	Euro	crisis	and	the	fiscal	austerity	in	the	
periphery	in	part	through	trade	with	the	outside.	A	fiscal	stimulus	in	the	core	would	
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plausibly	 likewise	have	a	significant	“leakage”	 in	 its	aggregate	demand	stimulus	to	
outside	the	euro	area,	reducing	some	of	the	authors’	estimates.	
	
	 The	 second	 absent	 channel	works	 through	nominal	wage	 rigidities.	 In	 new	
Keynesian	models,	 wage	 rigidities	 have	 a	 large	 effect	 on	 how	much	 the	 domestic	
economy	expands	after	a	fiscal	stimulus	as	well	as	on	the	international	transmission	
of	 domestic	 shocks	 (Gali,	 Lopez‐Salido,	 Valles,	 2007).	 The	 slow	 adjustment	 of	
nominal	wages	in	Southern	Europe	after	2011	suggests	this	is	empirically	relevant.	
	
	
III.	But	what	do	fiscal	expansions	and	multipliers	stand	for?	
		
	 Up	 to	 a	 first‐order	 approximation,	 to	 predict	 how	 output	 changes	 after	 a	
spending	stimulus	(∆Y),	we	need	to	multiply	the	size	of	the	stimulus	(∆G)	with	the	
partial	derivative	of	output	with	respect	to	spending	keeping	everything	else	 fixed	
(∂y/∂g).	The	same	applies	to	other	variables	rather	than	output.	This	is	the	spirit	of	
most	of	the	exercises	in	this	paper,	as	well	as	those	in	the	large	literature	that	in	the	
last	few	years	as	studied	the	stimulus	provided	by	government	spending.	
	
	 Yet,	each	of	the	two	terms	that	must	be	multiplied	is	problematic	when	trying	
to	confront	the	data.	Starting	with	∆G,	this	 is	 typically	quite	small	 in	XXIst	century	
stimulus	 programs.	 In	 the	 days	 of	 Keynes,	 the	 bulk	 of	 government	 spending	 in	
developed	countries	went	indeed	to	purchases	of	goods,	for	either	military	purposes	
or	 infrastructure.	 Theoretical	 thought	 experiments	 that	 involved	 building	 another	
bridge	or	highway	had	a	clear	counterpart	in	reality.	These	days	are	long	gone.	The	
largest	category	of	government	spending	in	almost	all	OECD	countries	is	nowadays	
transfer	payments,	not	consumption	purchases.	
	
	 As	 a	 result,	 when	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 breakdown	 of	 actual	 fiscal	 stimulus	
programs,	it	jumps	to	the	eye	that	most	of	them	consisted	in	increases	in	transfers.	
Between	2007	and	2009,	government	spending	shot	up	by	14%	in	the	United	States.	
Three	 quarters	 of	 this	 increase	 was	 on	 transfers.	 	 Looking	 at	 the	 increase	 in	
spending	 across	21	OECD	 countries	during	 this	 period,	Oh	 and	Reis	 (2012)	 found	
that	 in	 14	 of	 them	 the	 increase	 in	 transfers	 exceed	 the	 increase	 in	 government	
consumption	plus	investment.	Focusing	on	the	ARRA	stimulus	package	in	the	United	
States	between	2008	and	2010,	Cogan	and	Taylor	(2012)	found	that	almost	all	of	it	
consisted	of	transfers	to	states,	which	in	turn	used	it	to	pay	down	debt	or	fund	social	
transfers,	 with	 little	 funding	 going	 to	 government	 purchases.	 In	 short,	 in	modern	
stimulus	packages,	the	∆G	seems	too	small	for	the	stimulus	to	matter	all	that	much.	
	
	 The	partial	derivative	term	is	also	problematic	because	of	what	is	being	held	
fixed.	The	precise	ceteris	paribus	experiment	matters	a	great	deal	in	ways	that	make	
it	 hard	 to	 relate	 these	multipliers	 to	 the	data.	A	 few	examples	make	 this	 problem	
concrete.	 First,	 the	 authors	 assume	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 government	 purchases	 is	
paid	 off	 over	 time	 either	 using	 lump‐sum	 taxes	 (in	 their	 simple	 model)	 or	 labor	
income	taxes	 (in	 their	 larger	model).	But,	 in	 this	class	of	models,	 if	 instead	capital	
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income	taxes,	or	consumption	taxes	were	used,	the	multipliers	can	be	quite	different	
(Drautzburg	 and	 Uhlig,	 2015).	 Since	 actual	 fiscal	 stimulus	 packages	 rarely	 clearly	
specify	how	will	the	deficits	be	paid	for	in	the	future,	this	makes	it	hard	to	estimate	
their	 effect.	 Second,	 the	 time	 profile	 of	 taxes	 is	 likewise	 important	 by	 affecting	
intertemporal	relative	prices,	and	it	is	especially	important	whether	the	higher	taxes	
come	before	or	after	the	economy	leaves	the	zero	lower	bound	(Correia	et	al,	2013).	
Slight	 changes	 in	 the	 time	 profile	 of	 taxes	 can	 easily	 turn	 an	 expansionary	 fiscal	
stimulus	 into	 a	 contractionary	 policy.	 Third,	 what	 people	 know	 and	 don’t	 know	
about	the	future	size	and	duration	of	the	expansion	in	purchases	and	the	taxes	that	
pay	 for	 it,	 likewise	will	 affect	 their	 response	 to	 the	 stimulus	 (Leeper	 et	 al,	 2013).	
Again,	measuring	agents’	expectations	following	a	stimulus	 is	a	daunting	empirical	
task	after	the	fact,	let	alone	when	the	policy	is	being	discussed.	Fourth,	increases	in	
purchases	and	 their	effect	on	real	activity	will	affect	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	 fiscal	
automatic	 stabilizers	 act	 in	 the	 economy	 as	 well	 as	 their	 overall	 effectiveness	
(McKay	and	Reis,	2016).	
	
		 The	“all	else	 fixed”	problem	with	this	partial	derivative	also	applies	 to	non‐
fiscal	 variables.	 One	 concrete	 example	 is	 given	 by	 the	work	 of	 Feve	 et	 al	 (2013).	
Public	and	private	consumption	are	plausibly	non‐separable	in	the	utility	function	of	
households.	The	standard	assumption	of	separability	makes	it	easier	to	analyze	the	
theory	of	fiscal	stimulus,	and	it	is	also	adopted	by	the	authors,	because	it	keeps	fixed	
the	marginal	utility	of	consumption	 in	response	to	a	 the	stimulus.	But,	 if	 there	are	
complementarities	 instead,	 the	 fiscal	 expansion	 will	 raise	 this	 marginal	 utility.	
Because	 the	 zero	 lower	 bound	 equilibrium	 is	 characterized	 by	 having	 too	 low	
marginal	utility	of	consumption	in	the	present	relative	to	the	future,	due	to	too	high	
real	 interest	 rates,	 this	 provides	 another	 channel	 for	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
government	purchases.	
	
	 None	 of	 these	 caveats	 point	 to	 the	 authors’	 estimates	 being	 either	 clearly	
under	estimated	or	over	estimated.	Moreover,	most	of	 them	apply	as	much	to	this	
paper	 as	 they	 do	 to	 the	 large	 literature	 that	 in	 the	 last	 few	 years	 has	 estimate	
purchases	multipliers.	But	they	are	still	worth	stating,	and	repeating	many	times,	as	
so	 much	 research	 energy	 has	 been	 spent	 measuring	 a	 multiplier	 that	 is	 hard	 to	
properly	 define	 and	 that	 multiplies	 something	 that	 is	 so	 small	 in	 modern	 fiscal	
expansions.	
	
	
IV.	Bringing	in	modern	views	of	the	crisis	
	
	 This	 paper	 uses	 models	 and	 tools	 from	 the	 conventional	 macroeconomics	
toolkit.	 Brunnermeier	 and	Reis	 (2016)	 argue	 that,	 especially	when	 thinking	 about	
the	crisis	in	the	Eurozone,	this	toolkit	has	to	be	expanded	in	a	few	directions	to	be	
able	to	make	sense	of	the	crisis.	Because	this	paper’s	policy	study	applies	with	this	
crisis	in	the	background,	it	is	likewise	important	to	revisit	the	policy	analysis	taking	
these	modern	considerations	of	the	crisis	into	account.	
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	 The	 first	 important	 consideration	 is	 the	 spread	between	 sovereign	 interest	
rates	in	Germany	vis‐à‐vis	France	or	Italy.	The	sovereign	debt	crisis	in	the	periphery	
countries	 started	 with	 spikes	 in	 their	 sovereign	 interest	 rate	 spreads.	 Given	 the	
common	monetary	 policy,	 and	 so	 common	 exchange‐rate	 risk,	 the	 spreads	 reflect	
primarily	 the	 differential	 risk	 of	 default	 between	 those	 countries	 and	 Germany.	
What	would	happen	to	this	risk	premia	and	so	to	the	interest	rate	spreads	following	
a	fiscal	expansion	in	the	core?	
	
	 We	 can	 think	 of	 the	 expansion	 in	 the	 core	 as	 having	 two	 effects	 on	 the	
chances	 of	 a	 default	 in	 the	 periphery.	 First,	 by	 raising	 domestic	 output	 in	 the	
periphery,	 through	 the	 channels	 identified	 by	 the	 authors,	 the	 fiscal	 expansion	
lowers	the	benefits	of	defaulting.	Second,	by	lowering	the	core	real	interest	rate,	 it	
increases	 the	 supply	 of	 capital	 and	 lowers	 the	 cost	 of	 repaying	 the	 debt.	 Both	 of	
these	effects	 increase	the	 incentives	to	repay	the	debt	to	 foreign,	and	so	 lower	the	
risk	premia.	A	countervailing	effect	would	be	that	if	the	expansion	increases	the	risk	
that	 the	 core	 cannot	 repay	 its	 debt,	 it	 may	 raise	 its	 risk	 of	 default,	 thus	 raising	
interest	rates	 for	 the	periphery	as	well.	This	effect	 is	 likely	small,	given	the	size	of	
the	fiscal	stimulus	that	the	authors	have	in	mind,	and	the	level	of	the	public	debt	in	
the	core.	Therefore,	overall,	the	default	channel	would	lower	periphery	real	interest	
rates,	further	boosting	the	expansionary	effects	of	the	fiscal	stimulus.	
	
	 A	 second	 consideration	 to	 have	 is	 on	 the	 role	 of	 capital	misallocation.	 The	
Italian	economy	stopped	growing	well	before	the	crisis	of	the	last	few	years:	Italian	
per	 capita	 GDP	 barely	 increased	 between	 2000	 and	 2010.	 The	 same	 applies	 to	
Portugal,	and	if	one	focuses	on	productivity	growth,	Spain,	Greece,	and	Ireland	have	
all	gone	through	a	slump	with	the	creation	of	the	financial	and	monetary	union.	The	
euro	and	the	XXIst	century	came	with	a	productivity	slump	in	the	Eurozone	that	was	
followed	by	a	crash	in	these	countries	in	2010‐12.	
	
	 The	 evidence	 for	 several	 countries	 points	 to	misallocation	 of	 the	 abundant	
capital	flows	from	the	core	to	the	periphery	as	a	likely	culprit	for	this	slump	(Reis,	
2013).	In	Italy,	the	non‐tradables	sector	grew	at	the	expense	of	tradables	(Benigno	
and	 Fornaro,	 2016).	 In	 Portugal,	 within	 nontradables,	 it	 was	 the	 least	 productive	
and	 competitive	 sectors	 that	 absorbed	more	 of	 the	 capital	 flows	 and	 grew	 faster	
(Reis,	 2013).	 In	 Spain,	 even	within	 tradable	manufacturing	 the	 dispersion	 of	 firm	
productivity	increased,	as	smaller	and	less	productive	firms	being	kept	afloat	by	the	
abundant	 and	 cheap	 foreign	 capital	 (Gopinath	 et	 al,	 2016).	 How	 would	 a	 fiscal	
expansion	at	the	core	affect	the	allocation	of	capital	in	the	periphery?	
	
	 Perhaps	the	most	important	effect	would	come	through	higher	exports	in	the	
periphery.	Therefore,	the	sectors	that	would	most	benefit	are	those	associated	with	
exports	 to	 the	 core.	 Since	more	productive	 firms	 tend	 to	 export	more,	 this	would	
potentially	 promote	 a	 better	 allocation	 of	 resources.	 This	 channel	 would	 again	
potentially	increase	the	benefits	of	a	fiscal	expansion	at	the	core	on	the	periphery.	
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	 Third,	 the	 crisis	 has	 shown	 the	 importance	 of	 modern	 banks	 for	 the	
transmission	 of	macroeconomic	 shocks,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 economies	 to	 have	 safe	
assets.	 A	 fiscal	 expansion	 in	 the	 core	 that	 is	 funded	by	deficits,	 increases	 the	 safe	
core	public	debt,	alleviating	some	of	the	safe	asset	shortage	(Caballero	et	al,	2016).	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 increasing	 the	 supply	of	 national	 bonds	when	 there	 is	no	 euro‐
wide	bond	may	accentuate	 the	diabolic	 loop	between	banks	and	sovereigns	at	 the	
core,	 making	 it	 more	 exposed	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	
(Brunnermeier	et	al,	2016).	
	
	
V.	Conclusion	and	would	the	core	be	convinced?	
	
	 This	 paper	makes	 a	 useful	 contribution	 to	 a	 relevant	 and	 important	 policy	
question	today:	would	a	fiscal	expansion	in	Germany	stimulate	economic	activity	in	
welfare	 not	 just	 in	 Germany	 but	 in	 France	 and	 Italy	 as	well?	 The	 authors	 isolate	
three	important	features	of	these	economies	on	which	the	answer	will	depend:	the	
import	 content	 of	 government	 purchases,	 the	 slope	 of	 the	 Phillips	 curve,	 and	 the	
expected	 duration	 of	 the	 zero	 lower	 bound	 period.	 Moreover,	 they	 make	 a	
persuasive	case	for	the	effects	being	potentially	large,	and	for	both	countries	being	
better	off	as	a	result	of	the	fiscal	expansion.	
	
	 In	 these	 comments,	 I	 added	 three	 further	 considerations.	 Two	 other	
important	 factors	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 fiscal	 stimulus	 are	 the	 spillover	 of	 trade	
with	other	countries	outside	the	Eurozone	and	the	role	of	nominal	wage	rigidity	on	
the	slope	of	the	Phillips	curve.	Second,	I	criticized	the	focus	on	purchases	multipliers	
because	 actual	 changes	 in	 government	 purchases	 are	 usually	 small,	 and	 the	
estimation	of	multipliers	is	fraught	with	obstacles.	Third,	I	speculated	on	the	effects	
of	 a	 fiscal	 stimulus	 on	 the	 risk	 premium	 on	 sovereign	 bonds,	 on	misallocation	 of	
capital	 in	 the	periphery,	and	on	 the	supply	of	 safe	assets	and	 the	balance	sheet	of	
banks.	While	my	hope	is	that	these	add	to	the	understanding	of	the	question	posed	
by	 the	 authors,	 they	 do	 not	 detract	 from	 the	 relevance	 and	 significance	 of	 their	
contribution.	
	
A	 harder	 question	 is	whether	 a	 core	 country	would	 be	 convinced	by	 these	
arguments.	 On	 the	 positive	 side,	 this	 paper	 comes	 at	 the	 right	 time.	 In	 2010‐12,	
many	commentators	on	the	American	side	of	the	Atlantic	frequently	tried	to	make	a	
case	 for	a	 fiscal	 expansion	on	 the	European	side.	That	 case	 relied	on	applying	 the	
same	economic	argument	on	both	sides	of	 the	ocean:	when	nominal	 interest	rates	
are	zero,	higher	government	spending	does	not	raise	real	interest	rates	or	crowd	out	
investment,	but	rather	lowers	real	interest	rates	because	of	the	increase	in	expected	
inflation,	so	that	investment	is	crowded	in	and	the	stimulus	is	more	powerful.		
	
This	argument	went	nowhere	in	Europe	for	clear	and	good	reasons.	First,	to	
discuss	a	fiscal	expansion	for	the	Eurozone	as	a	whole	made	little	sense:	there	is	no	
federal	budget	or	government	to	undertake	this	expansion,	and	a	program	like	the	
American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009	in	the	United	States,	with	a	large	
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transfer	 across	 states,	 is	 almost	 politically	 impossible	 to	 entertain	 in	 Europe.	
Second,	 the	 countries	 going	 through	 a	 sovereign	debt	 crisis,	 like	Portugal,	 Greece,	
Ireland,	 Italy	 and	Spain	were	not	 at	 the	 zero	 lower	bound.	 In	 fact,	 during	 the	 two	
years	 of	 the	 crisis,	 even	 vague	 news	 that	 public	 spending	 would	 be	 higher	 than	
expected	would	lead	to	large	run‐ups	in	interest	rates,	so	the	extent	of	crowding	out	
was	very	 large.	Third,	 from	the	perspective	of	 the	core,	 the	German	economy	was	
booming	 during	 these	 years,	 so	 expansionary	 fiscal	 policy	 would	 have	 been	
procyclical.	 As	 much	 as	 American	 commentators	 were	 frustrated	 by	 how	 little	
influence	 their	 arguments	 had,	 European	 commentators	 were	 dismayed	 by	 how	
little	relevant	they	were	for	the	European	situation.	
	
In	 2016,	making	 the	 case	 for	 fiscal	 expansion	makes	more	 sense.	 Germany	
and	most	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 seem	 to	 satisfy	 now	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 zero	 lower	
bound,	 and	 both	 are	 projected	 to	 grow	 at	 a	 dismal	 1.7%,	 so	 that	 Germany	 is	 no	
longer	off	cycle	with	the	rest	of	the	area.	Moreover,	with	the	refugee	crisis,	a	modest	
fiscal	expansion	seems	inevitable.	It	seems	like	a	good	idea	to	discuss	now	whether	
this	fiscal	expansion	should	be	larger	so	that	it	goes	beyond	non‐refugee	spending.	
The	welfare	benefits	for	the	core	are	not	very	large,	but	they	are	positive.	Whether	
the	core	countries	will	be	convinced	is	harder	to	know.	
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